CAN THERE BE COMMON INTERPRETATION OF EUROPEAN
PRIVATE LAW?
Stephen Weatherill*

I. INTRODUCTION

Alan Watson recently stated:
To come ... to the idea of a single code of private law for the
European Union. The drafting of such a code would be
technically easy, despite political difficulties. The statutory law
would then be the same for all the nations. But what about
differences of interpretations? I have given several examples of
the ability of the lawyers of one country to take an extreme
interest in and pay great attention to the juristic opinion and
judicial decisions of another country which has a related system.
Conformity of interpretation will be a problem, but one must not
exaggerate. I have no doubt that legal scholars will scrutinize
decisions in all of the countries of the EU. When they notice
differences, they will write articles (even books) suggesting the
best approach for the future. Moreover, the private law of the
countries of the EU is not all that different.'
And I agree. Admittedly I might not be quite brave enough to write with such
deliciously deft provocation of the technical ease of this process of drafting.
And perhaps I would have lacked the brio required to append that final
sentence. But, shamed by my cowardice, I would nonetheless express
complete agreement with the insistence on the inter-jurisdictional dialogue that
today (for good or ill) nurtures the growth of elements of a common private
law for Europe.
My inquiry in this paper is directed at the role of the European Community
in shaping a common European private law. This involves (relatively brief)
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assessment of its constitutional competence at the general level (Part I1) and
the specific (Part I), and an outline ofits legislative track record in the private
law field so far (Part IV). In particular this paper focuses on the Directive as
an instrument of co-ordination of diverse legal systems, on the European
Court's interpretative function in ensuring that the promulgation of a Directive
is followed up by consistent application of its content in the legal orders of the
fifteen Member States, and on the role of the European Commission in
ensuring transparency in practice at national level. It is Directive 93/132 on the
suppression of unfair terms in consumer contracts, by common consent the
most remarkable of the measures of private law adopted by the European
Community, on which I focus (Part V). However, my claim is that this
Directive is a European Community law, which becomes (lots of) national
law(s), which at one level will differ (of course) but which will also remain
interconnected and capable of fostering a network of judicial and
administrative pathways to a mutually cross-referenced legal approach. In Part
VI of the paper I explore the emerging patterns of common interpretation.
II. CONSTITUrIONAL GENERALITIES3

The European Community as we know it today was established by treaty
in the 1950s." There were originally six Western European Member States,
now there are fifteen, and the number is likely to grow to embrace the majority
of the States in the continent of Europe within the next decade. The European
Union was created with effect from 1993 by the Maastricht Treaty.' This did
2 See Directive 93/13, infranote 46.

A fuller account is available in any of the leading textbooks; see, e.g., STEPHEN
WEATHERILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, EU LAW (Penguin Books, 3d ed., 1999); TREVOR HARTLEY,
THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (4th ed, 1998); PAUL CRAIG &GRAINNE DE
BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES AND MATERIUAIS (2d ed., 1999).
4 TREATYESTABLSINGTHEEUROPEANCOMMUNITY, Mar. 25,1957,298 U.N.T.S. 11. See
also TREATY ESTABuSHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3
(incorporating amendments and supplanting the original treaty) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
s TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, 1759 U.N.T.S. 3 (signed at Maastricht Feb.
7, 1992 and entered into force Nov. 1, 1993) [hereinafter Original Maastricht Treaty]. See also
TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340) 2 (incorporating amendments and
supplanting the original treaty) [hereinafter TREATYONEUROPEAN UNION]. Both the EC Treaty
and the Maastricht Treaty were amended by TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY
ON EUROPEAN UNION, THE TREATIES ESTABUSHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN
RELATED AcTs, Oct. 2, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1 [hereinafter TREATY OF AMSTERDAM]. To dispel
any confusion, consolidated versions ofboth amended treaties followed the Treaty of Amsterdam
in the Official Journal, as reflected in the EC Treaty and the Treaty on European Union.
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not abolish the European Community. Rather, it added to the existing patterns
of cooperation between the States as members of the EC devised new forms of
cooperation which were institutionally and constitutionally less sophisticated
than those found in the EC proper. So the European Union is a term that, from
the legal perspective, covers several forms of inter-State relationships,
although there are indications of mutation towards a discernible common
form.' However, it is the EC component of the EU, which possesses
significant legislative powers, on which this paper will focus.
A loose summary of the objectives of the European integration movement
lies in the desire to find new and more harmonious methods for peaceful and
prosperous coexistence between the states ofEurope than those employed with
such dismal results for an extended period before 1945. Tighter institutional
and constitutional links were forged. The Member States agreed by Treaty to
transfer power to autonomous institutions at the European level that would be
responsible for the elaboration of policy-making across the wide field of
economic activity for which regulatory competence had been conferred on the

EC by the Treaty. The preparation of legislation is (in almost all areas) the
exclusive preserve of the European Commission, a body staffed by nationals
of the Member States, but who in principle owe their loyalty to the broader
Community interest. Legislative acts are adopted according to a (rather
confusing) variety of available procedures, but the dominant mode today is so
called "co-decision" of both the European Parliament and the Council.7 The
Parliament has been directly elected by the peoples of Europe since 1979 and
represents the classic institution of representative democracy. The Council
possesses democratic credentials too, though it is sited in national systems of
representation rather than at the European level. The Council is comprised of
representatives of Member State governments, the precise identity of the
minister concerned varying according to the subject matter under discussion.
The transmission of State power through the institutional framework of the EC
is further affected by the applicable voting rules in the Council. Although
unanimity is required in some areas for the adoption of EC legislation, those
areas have shrunk on periodic Treaty revision over the last decade-and-a-half.8
' See, e.g., Deidre M. Curtin & Ige F. Dckker, The EU as a 'Layered' International
Organization: InstitutionalUnity in Disguise,in THE EVOLUTON OF EU LAW 83 (Paul Craig &
Grainne de Burca, eds., 1999); Bruno de Witte, The Pillar Structure and the Nature of the
European Union: Greek Temple or French Gothic Cathedral?,in THE EuRoPEA UNION AFTER
AMSTERDAM: A LEGAL ANALYSiS 51 (Ton Heukels et al., eds., 1998).
See EC TREATY art. 251 (setting forth the procedure).
Major formal revisions ofthe founding Treaties have been effected by the Single European
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It is increasingly common for the Council to be empowered to act by a species
of majority voting-"qualified" majority voting by which States are allocated
a voting power weighted according to population.9 In the areas to which
qualified majority voting is applicable, no State holds a veto. A Member State
of the EC may therefore be bound by legislation to which it objects strongly.
The binding legal acts that are available to the legislative institutions
include the Regulation, the Directive and the Decision.0 The Regulation is of
general application and is directly applicable within the legal orders of the
Member States. The Decision is of a more specific, typically administrative
nature. It is the Directive that is of central importance in the shaping of a
European private law, and it is the Directive that is the most intriguing of the
EC's available binding legal acts. According to EC Treaty Article 249, a
Directive "shall be binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each Member
State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national authorities the
choice of form and methods."" So Directives require implementation by
Member States (and a time gap, typically of a year or two, is allowed between
adoption of a Directive at the EC level and the deadline for its implementation
within the national legal order). They are absorbed into national legal cultures
and, after implementation, they will look different in each state.
In principle, though, all States should achieve the same result that pursued
by the Directive. In fact, the Directive serves as the most vivid illustration of
the insight that the EC governs by a model of "indirect rule," according to
which rule-making is located at transnational level but the overwhelming
majority of implementation and enforcement activity is allocated to and
embedded within established national structures of law and administration. 2

Act (with effect from IJuly, 1987), the original Maastricht Treaty (1 November, 1993) and the
Treaty of Amsterdam (1 May, 1999). See SINGLE EUROPEAN ACT, Feb, 17, 1986, 2 C.M.L.R.
741 (1987) (enacted in February of 1986 and in force 1 July 1987); TREATY ON EUROPEAN
UNION; TREATY OF AMSTERDAM. The next installment is planned to be the Treaty of Nice. The
Treaty has now been ratified by all Member States, although it has not yet entered into force.
See TREATY OF NICE, Mar. 10, 2001, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 1.
' See EC TREATY art. 205 (containing the figures).
10EC TREATY art. 249.
11Id.
12 IMPLEMENTING

EC LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: STRUCTURES FOR INDIRECT RULE

(Terence Daintith, ed., 1995). Cf.ADMINISTRATIVE LAW APPLCATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
COMMUNIrY LAW IN THE NETHERLANDS (John A.E. Vervaele, ed., 1994); COMPUANCE AND

ENFORCEMENT OF EC LAW (John A.E. Vervaele, eds., Kluwer, 1999). The EC constitutes a
"regulatory State" in Majone's phrase. See GLANDOMENICO MAJONE, REGULATING EUROPE
(Routledge, 1996).
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The "indirect rule" pattern is fundamental to the EC's characterization as a
parasitic bureaucracy which, judged by the size of its own staff and direct
expenditure, is simply tiny. In this sense the European Community's primary
modus operandiis not at all to replace national political processes but rather
to make those processes more European in their outlook.
The EC also possesses judicial institutions established by its Treaty. The
European Court of Justice is the body that possesses the competence to provide
authoritative interpretation of the meaning and effect of EC law. Remarkable
though such omission may seem, the EC Treaty makes no explicit reference to
the application of EC law by national judges, nor to the question of priority
should circumstances arise in which EC law comes into conflict with national
law. Public international law has rules on such matters. But from a very early
date the European Court struck out on its own, asserting that EC law
constituted a new legal order. In the landmark Van Gend en Loos 3 decision,
the Court insisted that "[i]ndependently of the legislation of the Member
States, Community law.. . not only imposes obligations on individuals but is
also intended to confer on them rights which become part of their legal
heritage."' 4 So EC law is capable of "direct effect," which means it may create
legally enforceable rights before national courts and tribunals. 5 Moreover, the
Court seized an early opportunity to add the principle of supremacy or
primacy. Community law overrides national law in the event of conflict
between the two orders. Again, this was left inexplicit on the face of the
founding Treaty. But in Costa v. ENEL 6 the Court explained that "[tihe
executive force of Community law cannot vary from one State to another in
deference to subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardising the attainment of
the objectives of the Treaty."' 7 Supremacy, then, was an indispensable
element in realizing the purposes of the Treaty. National judges should decline
to apply incompatible national rules.' The Court has also added the doubtless
logical but conspicuously bold confirmation that Community law overrides
even national constitutionally protected rights. 9 In this way the EC legal order
has been "constitutionalised. 2 ° The fundamental constitutional characteristics

11Case 26/62, 1963 E.C.IL 1.
14

Id.

IS

Id.

16

Case 6/64, 1964 E.C.R. 585.

"7

Id.

See Case 106/77, Simmenthal, 1978 E.C.R. 629.

t9 See Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschafl, 1970 E.C.R. 1125.
20

See, e.g., JOSEPH H.H. WEILER, THE CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: DO THE NEW CLOTHES
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of EC law have much in common with those which one would expect to
discover in the constitution of a federal-type State.' In particular, supremacy
appears to dictate a hierarchical relationship between the two levels of lawmaking, placing the (quasi-federal) federal rules on top. In PartiAcologiste
'Les Verts'v. Parliament' the Court went so far as to describe the Community
as "a Community based on the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member
States nor its institutions can avoid a review of the question whether the
measures adopted by them are in conformity with the basic constitutional
charter, the Treaty." 3
Of particular importance to the development of a European private law is
the working relationship established between national courts in the Member
States and the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg. As explained,
Directives are the instrument of legislative choice in EC intervention in the
field of private law; and Directives in principle require implementation by
Member States before they exert effects within the national legal order. This
may lead one to suppose that such rules will be digested at national level and,
their formal source of authority as EC norms notwithstanding, treated in
everyday judicial practice in the same way as orthodox local laws. Not so-in
principle, at least. Such re-nationalization of legal concepts is opposed
by the
EC law requirement that national rules that implement a Directive should be
interpreted in the light of that Directive.' The European dimension to the law
is enduring. A question of interpretation of a relevant Community rule can and
in some circumstances must be referred by a national judge to the European
Court in Luxembourg. This, the so-called preliminary reference procedure

HAVE AN EMPEROR? (Cambridge University Press, 1999); RENAUD DEHoUSSE, THE EUROPEAN

COURT OF JUsTICE (Macmillan, 1998); Jean-Claude Piris, Does the European Union Have a
Constitution? Does it Need One?, 24 EUR. L. REV. 557 (1999); Yairi Devuyst, The European
Union's Constitutional Order? Between Community Method and Ad Hoc Compromise, 18
BERKELEY J. INT'LL. 1 (2000); Paul Craig, Constitutions,Constitutionalism,and the European
Union, 7 EUR. L.J. 125 (2001); Thomas M. Mollers, 7he Role ofLaw in EuropeanIntegration,

48 AM. J. COMP. L. 679 (2000).

21See Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38 AM. J.

CoMP. L. 205 (1990).
" Case 294/83, 1986 E.C.R. 1339; see also Opinion 1/91, 1991 E.C.R. 1-6084 (concerning

draft of the EEA Agreement).
3 Case 294/83, 1986 E.C.R. 1339, 1365.
2 EC TREATY arts. 10, 249 linterpreted in this vein by the European Court. See Case C106/89, Marleasing v. La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion, 1990 E.C.R. 1-4135; Case

C-456/98 Centrosteel Sri v. Adipol Gmbh, 2000 E.C.R. 1-6007.
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found in Article 234 of the EC Treaty," secures for the European Court an
oversight of the development of the EC legal order and projects it into a
position in which it is able to promote a common interpretation of legal notions
found in EC laws, which doubtlessly will be inspired by, but need not be
congruent with, legal traditions within the Member States.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL SPECIFICS

For the purposes of this paper, the particular interest lies in legislative
activity undertaken by the European Community that affects private law. It is
the substance that is of primary concern, in particular Directive 93/13 on unfair
terms in consumer contracts (Part V below), but a brief constitutional tour
d'horizon of the specifics is worthwhile, not least to make the point that the
very constitutional validity for EC intervention in private law remains
contested, just as the desirability of injecting a European element into private
law is also hotly disputed by some national private lawyers.
Article 5(1) of the EC Treaty states the constitutionally fundamental point
that the EC possesses only the competences conferred on it by its Treaty.26 It
is a functionally limited organization. It is not omnicompetent. This is crucial
to appreciation of its constitutional character and, in turn, of its relationship
with the Member States. So the question, "is the EC competent to act in a
particular field?," is, in principle, easily answered: "It depends if there is an
authorisation found in the Treaty."
Is the EC equipped by its Treaty with the competence to legislate in the
field of private law? No-at least not explicitly. It has, nonetheless, a
modestly impressive track record of legislative intervention in the field of
private law. Small steps have made in the field of tort law or delict," and there
has also been limited intervention to set Community rules governing
commercial contracts.2" But the lion's share of the Community's legislative
activity in the private law field has been claimed by the regulation of consumer
contracts. How, then, has this come about, given the basic constitutional

" See WEATHERILL & BEAUMONT, supra note 3, at ch. 9.
2 See EC TREATY art. 5(1).
27 See Directive 85/374, 1985 O.J. (L 210) 29 amended by Council Directive 99/34, 1999
O.J. (L 141) 20 (the "Product Liability" Directive).
' See, e.g., Directive 86/653, 1986 O.J. (L 382) 17 (concerning self-employed commercial
agents). See also Directive 2000/35, 2000 O.J. (L 200) 35 (combatting late payment in
commercial transactions); Directive 93/37, 1993 O.J. (L 199) 34 (concerning the co-ordination

of procedures for the award of public works contracts).
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deficiency that denies the EC explicit competence under its Treaty to legislate
in the private law field?
The Maastricht Treaty, which came into force in November of 1993,
introduced into the EC Treaty an explicit competence conferred on the
Community in the field of consumer protection.29 This was lightly amended
with effect from 1 May, 1999 by the Amsterdam Treaty and today is found in
Article 153 of the EC Treaty.3" It is there provided that in order to promote the
interests of consumers and to ensure a high level of consumer protection, the
Community shall contribute to protecting the health, safety and economic
interests of consumers, as well as to promoting their right to information,
education and to organize themselves in order to safeguard their interests. This
is to be achieved by the adoption of measures which support, supplement and
monitor the policy pursued by the Member States. This plainly places the
Community as an actor in a position subordinate to that of the Member States
in this field. In fact, very few Community acts have been adopted on this
basis, and none of them were remotely revolutionary.3 The key to the EC's
relatively well-developed track record in the field of consumer contract law
lies in a competence to which cross-reference is made in EC Treaty Article
153, but which has a much longer pedigree than Article 153, a Maastricht
innovation. This is the competence to harmonise State laws. Such a
competence has always been possessed by the European Community. In the
original Treaty, it was found in Article 100. Since 1987, and the entry into
force of the Single European Act, which amended the original Treaty, this has
been supplemented by a provision that was numbered Article 100a. The
Treaty of Amsterdam changed the numbers of both provisions; Article 100 was
converted in unamended form into EC Treaty Article 94 EC with effect from
May 1, 1999, while Article 100a was lightly amended and became EC Treaty
Article 95.
The provisions confer a competence on the European Community in the
following terms. Article 94 (ex Article 100) provides that Directives may be

29 See Stephen Weatherill & Hans W. Micklitz, Consumer Policy in the European
Community: Before and After Maastricht, 16 J. CONSUMR POL'Y 285 (1993).
" See Jules Stuyck, European Consumer Law After the Treaty of Amsterdam: Consumer
Policy in or Beyond the Internal Market?, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 367 (2000).
"' See, e.g., Decision 3092/94, 1994 O.J. (L 331) 1, amended by Council Decision 95/184

1995 O.J. (L 120) 36 (on the establishment of a system of information on home and leisure
accidents); Directive 98/6 1998 O.J. (L 80) 27 (on indication of prices offered to consumers;
Council Decision 283/99 (1999 O.J. (L 34) 1) (establishing a legal framework for Community
activities in favour of consumers).
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issued "for the approximation of such laws, regulations or administrative
provisions of the Member States as directly affect the establishment or
functioning of the common market."32 Article 95 (ex Article 100a) provides
for the adoption ofmeasures-not simply Directives, although Directives have
been the dominant form of legislative act-"for the approximation of the
provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member
States which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the
internal market."33 One may wonder what distinct functions are envisaged for
these two plainly similar provisions. In fact, the critical distinction is not
substantive but rather relates to the applicable voting rules. Directives may be
adopted under Article 94 only with the unanimous support of all the Member
States in Council, whereas Article 95 allows adoption by qualified majority
vote in Council (plus the support of the European Parliament under the codecision legislative procedure). 3' So, in the latter case, States may be outvoted
in Council yet be bound by relevant legislation. This is not common, for
consensual decision-making remains normal EC practice, but it can and does
occur.
The term "approximation" may seem to connote a less intrusive process
than that of "harmonisation" but in fact nothing has turned on this supposed
distinction in communautaire practice and it is customary to refer to the
"harmonisation programme" when surveying the legislative fruits of these
Treaty provisions. But, as the text of the relevant provisions discloses, this is
not a competence to harmonise laws in the abstract. Rather, it is a competence
to harmonise laws in pursuit of defined ends-loosely, in pursuit of the
integration of markets in Europe.
Both provisions, and especially latterly Article 95, have been used and
continue to be used with vigour by the Community legislature to harmonise
national laws that are perceived to impede the creation of an integrated market
for Europe. And insofar as the national laws that are subjected to a process of
harmonisation are contract laws, then the result is the relocation of decisionmaking on the shape of (harmonised) contract law to the European level. This
is in spite of the fact that contract law is not mentioned at all as a legitimate
subject of the harmonisation programme. In fact, harmonisation under the
Treaty is not functionally limited.35 The consequence has been an opportunity

12
13

EC TREATY art. 94.
Id. at art. 95.
I' at art. 251; see Part II supra.
Id.
EC Treaty, Article 95(2) excludes from Article 95(1) the possibility to harmonise fiscal
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for the Community legislature to develop a functionally extensive scope to the
harmonisation programme. This opportunity has been seized, in consumer
contract law in particular, but also to some extent in private law generally, and
in other fields of regulatory activity such as labour market regulation36 and
environmental protection."
Directive 85/577 on "Doorstep Selling" provides a particularly striking
example." It is stated in the Directive's preamble that the practice of doorstep
selling is the subject of different rules in different Member States, and that
"any disparity between such legislation may directly affect the functioning of
the common market." 3'
The case for harmonisation is treated as
made-without more. In fact, the consumer protection aspect of the measure
receives more extensive attention in the Directive's preamble. Reference is
made to the soft law programmes of 1975 and 1981, taking the shape of nonbinding Council Resolutions,' which promised action in this area, and it is
observed that consumers may be "unprepared" in negotiations for contracts
away from business premises, which are accordingly the subject of regulation
under the Directive. Subsequent Directives tend to include rather more detail
than the uniquely terse explanation found in Directive 85/5 77, but as a general
observation the link that binds disparity between national laws in these realms
and an effect on the functioning of the common market is typically asserted,
not proven, and the choices made in favour of consumer protection are freely
acknowledged even though, in strict constitutional terms, these measures were
adopted under the EC Treaty as measures of harmonisation, predominantly
focused on market-building. So, from a constitutional perspective, EC
provisions, those relating to the free movement of persons and those relating to the rights and
interests of employed persons. The sensitivity underlying this exclusion from the material scope
of Article 95 is that Article 95(1) allows legislation to be made by the Article 251 procedure,
which involves a qualified majority vote in Council rather than the unanimity required to act
under Article 94. The background lies in the implacable hostility of the U.K. government of the
1980's to EC legislative action in these fields other than by the veto-preserving rule of unanimity
in Council.
m See, e.g., CATHERINE BARNARD,EC EMPLOYMENT LAW (Oxford, 2d ed., 2000).
37See, e.g., JOANNE SCOTT, EC ENv1RoNMENTALLAw(Longman Publishing, 1998); JANH.
JANs, EuROPEAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Europa Law Publishing, 2000).

" Directive 85/577, 1985 O.J. (L 372) 31, 1985 O.J. (L 372) 31.
39Id.

o Council Resolution, 1975 O.J. (C 92) 1 (noting a preliminary programme for a consumer
protection and information policy); Second Council Resolution, 1981 O.J. (C 133) 1. See
generallySTIHEN WEATHERILL, EC CONSUMER LAW AND POLICY ch. I (Longman Publishing
1997) (discussing soft law development of EC consumer policy); GERAwnT G. HOWELLS &

THoMAs WHJIELMSSON, EC CONSUMER LAW ch. I (Dartmouth Publishing 1997).

2002)

COMMON INTERPRETATION OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW?

149

consumer protection and contract law developed as a by-product of the process
of market-building through harmonisation, generated by the perception that,
insofar as different rules are applied in different Member States, the pursuit of

trade integration may be hindered by the disparity between national laws and
that therefore common Community rules are required.
But the political reality was that the Member States were agreed on the
desirability of legislative action in these fields, as reflected in the Council
Resolutions on the development of a consumer protection policy for the EC.
They therefore proceeded to act without any particular sensitivity for the

constitutional constraints imposed by the principle that the Treaty confers only
defined competences on the Community. Harmonisation, then, allows
"functional creep" in the scope of the Community's activities,"' which may
take the EC into areas of common rule-making for which its Treaty offers no
explicit mandate beyond the horizontal power to harmonise.
In this way the apparent deficiencies of the EC Treaty in providing an
authorisation for legislative intervention in the field of contract law have been
overcome by a broad reading of the Treaty provision creating a competence to
harnonise laws in pursuit of market-building. It is only recently that serious
anxiety has emerged about the constitutional validity of this open-handed
approach to the competence to harmonise. This is largely provoked by the rise
of Qualified Majority Voting in the Council, which has released the possibility
of legislative action at the EC level under a procedure which lacks the support
of the governments of all the Member States. In October 2000, the European
Court of Justice for the first time annulled a Directive adopted as a
harmonisation measure on the basis that the challenged measure did not
adequately contribute to the market-making objectives set out in Article 95.41
Germany, opposed to the measure that imposed strict restrictions on the
advertising of tobacco products, had been outvoted in Council, but succeeded
in persuading the Court that the majority of Member States had taken an
impermissibly broad approach to the interpretation of the EC's competence.
The implication of the Court's invalidation of the Directive was that it believed
the majority among the Member States were improperly dressing up a measure
ofpublic health policy in the ill-fitting guise ofmarket-building harmonisation
of laws in order to circumvent the Treaty's prohibition against the EC acting

"' See Mark A. Pollack, CreepingCompetence: The Expanding Agenda of the European
Community, 14 J. PUB. POL'Y 95 (1994).
42Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council, 2000 E.C.R. 1-8419.
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as a source of common rules in the public health field."3 The judgment,
infused with an anxiety to protect minority (State) rights, has generated an
anxious debate about the precise limits of EC competence in the field of
harmonisation oflaws." However, this will not be explored further within the
confines of this paper which focuses on the Community's established track
record as a legislator in the field of private law and in consumer contract law
in particular.
IV. EC PRIVATE LAW-THE TRACK RECORD INTHE FIELD OF
CONSUMER CONTRACT LAW

The principal pieces of EC legislation which put in place the emergence of
a European consumer contract law have all been adopted under the Treaty as
measures of harmonisation of laws. They are:
1. Directive 99/44 on certain aspects of the sale of consumer
goods and associated guarantees.45
2. Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts."
3. Directive 90/314 on package travel, package holidays and
package tours. 7

4. Directive 85/577 on the protection of the consumer in respect
of contracts negotiated away from business premises (the
"Doorstep Selling" Directive)."
5. Directive 87/1024' on consumer credit, as amended by
Directives 90/880 and 98/7."
6. Directive 97/7 on the protection of consumers in respect of
distance contracts.52

4 EC TREATY arts. 5(I) & 152(4).

Cf Stephen Weatherill, The EuropeanCommission 's Green Paperon EuropeanContract
Law, 24 J. CONSUMER POL'Y 339 (2001); Phil Syrpis, Smoke Without Fire: The SocialPolicy
Agenda and the InternalMarket, 30 INDus. L.J. 271 (2001).
4' Directive 99/44, 1999 O.J. (L 171) 12.
Directive 93/13, 1993 O.J. (L 95) 29.
'7 Directive 90/314, 1990 O.J. (L 158) 59.
Directive 95/577, supranote 38.
49 1987 O.J. (L42) 48.
so Directive, 97/7, 1990 O.J. (L 61) 14.
sI Directive, 90/314, 1998 O.J. (L 101) 17.
52

Directive, 97/7, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19.
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7. Directive 94/47 on the protection of purchasers in respect of
certain aspects of contracts relating to the purchase of the
on a timeshare basis (the
right to use imnovable properties
53
"Timeshare" Directive).
8. Directive 97/5 on cross-border credit transfers.'
9. Directive 00/31 on certain legal aspects of information society
services, in particular electronic commerce, in the internal
market ('Directive on electronic commerce')."
One could certainly go further in compiling a list of EC measures relevant to
contract law by, for example, adding relevant texts in the field of employment
law 56 and, more generally still, by examining the complex web of legislation
adopted in the field of competition law which serves to control contractual
freedom in the name of the suppression of anti-competitive and/or antiintegrative activities."' One might also cite the Brussels Convention58 and the
Lugano Convention5 9 which provide in cases of a cross-border contractual
dispute which court should hear the case and what shall be the applicable law.
But such a broad inquiry would likely become unmanageable and the length
of the list above already provides quite sufficient proof of the importance of
the EC as an actor in the contract law field.
In aggregate, these measures make up the emerging, albeit certainly
incomplete, shape of a European-or at least a European Communitycontract law system. The majority of relevant EC sources add to national law
but do not replace it, for harmonisation of rules affecting the economic
interests of consumers is typically pitched at a minimum level,' generating a
complex layered system of legal regulation in which there will be variation
State by State even in areas subject to harmonisation in so far as states choose

S

Directive, 94/47, 1994 O.J. (L 280) 83.

Directive 97/5, 1997 O.. (L 43) 25.
5 Directive 00/31, 2000 O.J.(L 178) 1.
See BARNARD, supra note 36.
SI Seegenerally WEATHERnLL& BEAUMONT, supra note 3 (noting chapters 22-27 especially).
s'1968 Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters (consolidated version), 1998 O.J. (L 27) 1. This is now found in
Regulation 44/2001, 2001 O.J. (LI2) I.
59 Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters, 19880.1. (L 319) 9.
'oSee JULES STUYCK, PatternsofJustice in the EuropeanConstitutionalCharter:Minimum
Harmonisation in the Field of Consumer Law, in LAW AND DIFFUSE INTERESTS IN THE
EUROPEAN LEGAL ORDER (Ludwig Kramer et al., eds. 1997).
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to set stricter standards. EC consumer law does not pretend to be a fully selfsufficient system. Rather it supplements pre-existing national regimes and for
that reason its absorption into national systems may cause some indigestion if
not handled with care."' This awareness of the contingent and patchwork
nature of EC consumer law is not a denial of the validity of analysis designed
to draw out underpinning themes in EC consumer law such as the promotion
of social justice, theprotection of legitimate expectations, tackling information
asymetries, the role of the well-informed consumer and the quest to build
consumer confidence in the viability of the internal market.62 The unusual
constitutional status of EC contract law is not at all a reason for excepting it
from rigorous and constructive academic analysis, but rather only a reason for
ensuring that such analysis pays due regard to the actual constitutional context.
But until recently, given unanimous support in Council, EC consumer law and
private law (of sorts) emerged from the harmonisation programme, although
not always as part of a coherent overall framework.
The dominant tendency in most of these Directives is to establish legal
rules governing pre-contractual obligations and not to interfere with the actual
content of the bargain struck between the parties. Typically information must
be disclosed. For example, Directive 97/7 on the protection of consumers in
respect of distance contracts' has as its background the increasing
technological feasibility of establishing means of distribution other than
through face-to-face contact between trader and consumer. Article 4 provides
that "in good time prior to the conclusion of any distance contract [as
defined]," the consumer shall be provided with stipulated information about

"

See NEW EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAWAND CONSUMER PROTECTION (Wolfgang Heusel ed.,

Bundesanzeiger 1999) (concerning the challenge of absorption); HANS SCHULTKE-NOELE &
REINERScHuLzE, EuROPAEISHE REcHT ANGLEICHUNGUNDNATIONAIEPRIVATRECHTE (Baden-

Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft 1999).
41 See, e.g., HANS W. MICKLTZ, RECHTSEINHEIT ODER RECHTSVIELFALT IN EUROPA? ROLLE

UND FUNKTION DES VERBRAUCHERRECHTS INDER EG UND DEN MOE-STAATEN (Baden-Baden:
Nomos Verlagagesellschaft 1996); Hans W. Micklitz, PrinciplesofSocial Justice in European
Private Law, 19 Y.B. EuR. L. 167 (2000); Wulf-Henning Roth, Berechtige
Verbrauchererwartungen im Europaeischen Gemeinschaft, in EUROPAEISCHE
RECmTSANGLEICmUNG UND NATIONALE PRIVATRECHTE, supra note 61; NOBERT REICH,
EUROPmSCm VERBRAUCHERRECHT (1996). See HANSW. MICKUTz, VerbraucherschutzWest
versus Ost-Kompatibilisierungsmoeglichketenin derEG,in BRUECKENSCHLAGZWiSCHEN DEN

RECHTSKUL"UMENDESOSTSEERAUMS (Helmut Heiss, ed. 2001) (discussing the challenge in light
of inqending enlargement).
See Directive 977, supra note 52.
Id. art. 4, at 22.
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matters including the identity of the supplier, the main characteristics of the
goods or services, and the price of the goods or services including all taxes.
The aim is a more informed bargaining environment and a more efficient,
competitive market,"5 although there are of course a great many questions to
be addressed in connection with the rationality of this choice of regulatory
technique.'
The Directives listed above also typically provide that an
opportunity must be allowed to the consumer to withdraw from the contract for
a defined period after its conclusion. Article 6 of Directive 97/7 makes
provision for the consumer's right of withdrawal, which is to extend for at
least seven working days after agreement but which may be extended where
the trader has failed to abide by the obligations to supply information.' The
assumption appears to be that the consumer requires protection and a
possibility to draw on further information, albeit in the post-contractual rather
than the pre-contractual phase."
The EC's intervention does not only take the form of mandatory
information disclosure and the opportunity to cool off. There is a more
ambitious dimension. Some intrusion has been made into controlling and
defining the content of the contract. Directive 99/44 on certain aspects of the
sale of consumer goods and associated guarantees is significant," but the
centrepiece of this small group of measures is Directive 93/13, on unfair terms
in consumer contracts. This merits closer attention.
V. DIREcrIVE 93/13-THE REGULATION OF UNFAIR TERMS IN
CONSUMER CONTRACTS

Directive 93/13 harmonises the divergent approaches taken in the Member
States of the EU to the regulation of unfair terms in consumer contracts.7" Its
legal base was Article 100a of the EC Treaty which is now Article 95 after
' See Stephen Weatherill, The Role ofthe Informed Consumer in European Community Law
and Policy, 2 CONSUMER LJ. 49 (1994).
"See PARTY AUTONOMY AND THE ROLE OF INFORMATION IN THE INTERNAL MARKET (Stefan

Grunman et al. eds.) (2001).
See Directive 97/7, art. 6, supra note 52, at 22-23.
Cf Pamaria Rekaiti & Roger Van den Bergh, Cooling-offperiods in the Consumer Laws
of the EC Member States: A Comparative Law and Economics Approach, 23 J. CONSUMER
67

POL'Y 371 (2000) ("The consumer protection laws of the EC Member States tend to be viewed
as a set of rules aimed at protecting weak consumers from manipulations and abuses by
producers and traders and strengthening the former's bargaining position.").
See Directive 99/44, supra note 45.
70

See Directive 93/13, supra note 46.
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amendment and re-numbering effected from 1 May, 1999 by the Treaty of
Amsterdam. This means that the Directive was adopted by "co-decision" of
Council and Parliament, and it was open to adoption by qualified majority vote
in Council, though in fact all the Member States in Council voted in favour of
the adoption of the Directive. Politically, then, it was not especially
controversial. Among the audience of private lawyers the reception has been
rather different.
The purpose of the Directive is, according to Article 1(1), "to approximate
the laws, regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States
relating to unfair terms in contracts concluded between a seller or supplier and
a consumer."'" The categories of seller, supplier and consumer are defined
further in Article 2. Article 3(1) of the Directive contains the meat. It
provides that "[a] contractual term which has not been individually negotiated
shall be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it
causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising
under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer. "72 And, according to
Article 6(1), such "unfair" terms are not binding on the consumer.73 The
meaning of "unfair" for these purposes is amplified via Article 3(3), which
refers to the Annex to the Directive which contains an "indicative and
non-exhaustive list of the terms which may be regarded as unfair."74 It is, then,
a supporting grey list, rather than a black list; it contains terms that may be
treated as unfair depending on the circumstances, but which are not necessarily
to be regarded as unfair as a matter of EC law75 (though since the Directive
applies only minimum standards, it is open to States to maintain or introduce
stricter rules, which could include conversion of the grey list into a black list,
according to local preference).
The Directive has been duly implemented into the legal orders of the
Member States. This transformation has required that choices be made about
how to give effect to it, in accordance with the demands of the "indirect rule"
model. 76 In a field such as this, where diverse practices at both the substantive
and the institutional level have accumulated in the Member States over the
decades since public control of contractual freedom became accepted as a
necessary consequence of the rise in mass production and the diminished
"' Id. art. 1(1), at31.
Id. art. 3(1), at 31.
6(a), at 31.
- Id. art. 3(3), at 31, 33.
75 Id. at 33.
76 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
72

73 Id. art.
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capacity of the consumer to bargain effectively in the marketplace, the

accommodation of EC (minimum) standards within the national system is not
straightforward. For code-based systems, questions arise about the capacity

of the EC's sector-specific intervention to prise open the coherence of the
overall framework; how, then, should the implementation of a Directive
governing consumer contract law relate to the broader scheme of the private
law? The United Kingdom, neither blessed nor burdened by a code, took the
pragmatic line of least resistance and simply enacted a statutory instrument
designed to implement the Directive," leaving it to subsequent practice to
elucidate the fit between the control envisaged by the Directive and that
already applied by courts applying the statutory and common law controls that
pre-date EC-level intervention and which in some respects surpass its scope
while in others display more modest regulatory ambition.78
Different legal orders will encounter different types of problems in
absorbing the control envisaged by the Directive into the domestic system, but
the issue transcends technical questions of implementation. The EC-level
control forbids the enforcement of a term that falls within the scope of
application of the regime that is "unfair", a benchmark which is amplified by
the instruction to consider whether "contrary to the requirement of good faith,
it causes a significant imbalance in the parties' rights and obligations arising
under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer."79 "Good faith" has
different resonances in different systems of private law. But it is the common
European content to the notion that is of particular interest. For English and
Scots lawyers, at least, the injection of good faith into contract law creates (for
good or ill) a platform for a potentially more intrusive judicial inquiry into the
product of the parties' free will than has long been considered orthodox"0 and
this in turn has stimulated interest in the prospect (for good or ill) of legal
cross-fertilisation between the private law systems of the Member States via

" See Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations, (1999) S.I. 2083 (replacing the
original implementing measure, 1994 S.I. 3159, inter alia to extend enforcement mechanisms).
71See GERAINT HOWELLS & STEPHEN WEATHERILL, CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW ch. 9
(Dartmouth Publishing 1995) (providing a detailed examination).
Directive 93/13, supra note 46, art. 3.
o See, e.g., Hugh Beale, Legislative Control ofFairness: The Directive on Unfair Terms in
Consumer Contracts, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT INCONTRACT LAW (Jack Beatson & Daniel
Friedmann, eds. 1995); Hugh Collins, Good Faith in European Contract Law, 14 OXFORD J.
LEGAL STUD. 229 (1994); Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How
Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REv. 11 (1998); GOOD FAITH IN
CONTRACT AND PROPERTY LAW (Angelo D.M. Forte, ed. 1999).
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the channel of EC legislative harmonisation, a phenomenon of general interest
but one brought into sharper focus by the common EC control over contractual
unfairness introduced by Directive 93/13.8"
The ambitious quest to construct a European contract law has attracted
much academic discussion, mostly critical, and often of a rather polemical
nature." For some commentators, the vehicle of legislative harmonisation is
inappropriate for this task. Private law, it is argued, represents the
accumulation of centuries of legal tradition (which may also be part of broader
cultural and social tradition). To treat divergent national regimes as mere
distortions to trade and to subject them to the discipline of legislative
harmonisation is, from this perspective, to underplay the richness of their
contribution."3 More specifically, intervention in the name of harmonisation
may fail to take sufficient account of the complex functions performed by
private law in a mature national legal system and may accordingly destabilize
the integrity of national systems. EC harmonisation has deepened the gulf
between commercial contract law and consumer contract law (but the
bifurcation long pre-dates the EC). A still more vigorous version of this
objection would deny that a process of convergence of private law in Europe
is even culturally feasible because of the fundamentally and irreducibly
divergent epistemological assumptions ("mentalites") which underpin common
law and civil law approaches."

"I See GOOD FAITH IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (Reinhard Zinnrmann & Simon
Whittaker, eds. 2000) (providing an inquiry into the results as well as the routes taken by
different national systems).
2 See, e.g., TOWARDS A EUROPEANCIVILCODE (Arthur Hartkarnp, ed., 2d ed. 1998) (for an
introduction to the debate); OLE LANDO & HUGH BEALE, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT
LAW, Parts I and 11(Kluwer, 2000); THE HARMONISATION OF EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (Mark
van Hoecke & Francois Ost, eds. 2000); Roger Van den Bergh, Subsidiarityas an Economic
DemarcationPrincipleand Emergence of EuropeanPrivate Law, 5 MAASTRcHT J. EUR. &
COMP.L. 129 (1998); Marie-Jean Campana, Vers un Langage JuridiqueCommun en Europe?,
8 EuR. REV. PRIVATE L. 33 (2000); Peter-Christian Mueller-Graff, Die Europaeische
Privatrechtsgesellschafl in der erfassung der Europaeischen Union in RECHT UND
RECHTSWiSSENsCHAFr (Peter-Christian Mueller-Graff & Herbert Roth, eds., 2000); LUKE
NOTTAGE, CONVERGENCE, DIVERGENCE AND THE MIDDLE WAY INUNIFYING OR HARMONISING
PRIVATE LAW (European University Institute, Working Paper Law No. 2001/01), availableat
www.iue.it/LAW/res/nottage/EUIWorking Papaer4.pdf.
' See, e.g., Christian Joerges, EuropeanChallengesto Private Law: On FalseDichotomies,
True Conflicts and the Needfor a ConstitutionalPerspective, 18 LEGAL STUD. 146 (1998).
" This assault is particularly closely associated with Pierre Legrand; see, e.g., Pierre
Legrand,EuropeanLegal Systems areNot Converging,45 INT'L&COMP. L.Q. 52 (1996); Pierre
Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, 60 MOD. L. REV. 44 (1997).
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Turning the criticism around, other writers have expressed scepticism that
market-making in Europe is in any event dependent on or even usefully
promoted by the harmonisation of private law. Ernst Steindorff has objected
that " ... civil law has to secure values which have been developed in Europe
over more than two thousand years.""5 Why, he asks, should the quest for
enhanced market freedom be placed in such a privileged position that it
requires the Member States to set aside the task of protecting traditional
values?" Then, applying this diagnosis to private law, he calls for future
"efforts to reconcile State and Community levels of private law where they
conflict in specific situations. This should be guided by research as to where
there are the major insufficiencies of law with respect to the internal market.""
Steindorff's remarks have much in common with those of the Commission
lately set out in its Communication on European Contract Law, published in
the summer of 200188 and designed to promote debate about the proper future
directions of EC policy in the field of contract law.89 The Commission is
explicitly concerned in its Communication to identify concrete problems in the
construction of an integrated market for the EU which are caused by existing
divergences between national systems of contract law and, if such concrete
problems are demonstrated, to provoke comments on defining possible
solutions."0 One may readily speculate that search costs are incurred by parties
unfamiliar with laws governing contracts in jurisdictions other than their own,
but the Commission wants to pin down whether and when this is really so, and
how high such costs are, before it considers whether the problems are of a
sufficient magnitude to call for EC-level action. Plainly it wishes to back any
future legislative proposals with corroborated evidence of the need for
intervention by the EC legislature in the quest to build an integrated market.
The constitutional limits of the harmonisation of private law have long been
obscured by the practice of unanimous voting in Council (Part III above), but
the sensitivities that attach to the rise of qualified majority voting in Council,
typified by the successful recourse to the European Court by Germany to
secure annulment of over-ambitious use of the Treaty provision authorising

S5 Ernst Steindorff, Annotation of Case C-104/96, 36 COMMON MKT. L. REv. 191, 202

(1999).
96 Id. at 203.
87 Id.

"Communication on European Contract Law, July 2001, COM 398.
89 See Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
on European Contract Law, COM (01) 398 final at 2.
o See id. at paras. 22-33, 72.
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harmonisation in the "Tobacco Advertising" case, 9' generate increasing
attention to the very validity of EC activity in the private law field, not simply
its desirability. This is why the European Commission is currently proceeding
cautiously as it considers the preparation of future legislative initiatives.
Scepticism about the functional need for legislative harmonisation in the
building of integrated markets invites concrete inquiry of the type currently
being pursued by the European Commission, outlined in the preceding
paragraph. But allegations of the type summarised above which revolve
around perceived damage done by the EC to legal tradition are more difficult
to meet, not least because the claim to a cultural content to private law tends
to be advanced in a rather imprecise fashion. How "cultural" is law? At least,
how distinctively locala culture is represented or created by law? Even a brief
glance at European history informs us that the compartments currently filled
by national law represent an atypically segmented pattern. Law in Europe has
normally taken political borders much less seriously. The Commission has on
occasion taken the trouble to defend itself against the charge that EC
intervention is destructive of the integrity of national systems of private law.
In its Report on the Implementation of Directive 93/13 on Unfair Terms, it
asserts that "[d]espite the misgivings of the proponents of a certain legal
doctrine who feared that unity of contract law would be rent asunder, the
Member States were able to integrate the Directive into their legal orders
without major problems." 2 One may doubt whether this rather complacent
statement will satisfy all critics. The Commission might be better advised to
cite its detailed desire to uncover instances of damage caused by the absence
of harmonised private law within a broader context that insists on the case that
the natural state of private law in Europe is to operate as a transnational
phenomenon. This more sweeping, ambitious and historically informed level
of debate would serve to correct unspoken (and sometimes even spoken)
assumptions about the inevitable association of a State with its own exclusive,
untransplantable legal system.
True, one cannot take a "European private law" off the shelf, whether it is
made up of small trinkets of sector-specific legislative harmonisation or
gaudily packaged as the European Civil Code which has so attracted the
European Parliament.93 But, although I freely concede that "integration" is of

, See Case C-376/98, Germany v. Parliament and Council, 2000 E.C.R. 1-8419.
Report from the Commission on the Implementation of Council Directives 93/13/EEC of
5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, COM (00) 248 final at 30.
"3See Guido Alpa, EuropeanCommunityResolutions andthe Codificationof 'PrivateLaw',
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itself not a value that is worth promoting,9" it is hollow to suppose that national
legal orders do not interact with one another and, in so doing, move closer
together. Legal systems mutate over time. They learn and they borrow from
each other. This is especially significant, when they are interconnected within
the dynamic system of law created by the European Community. This may not
be convergence in its literal sense, but it is far from negligible as a type of
legal cross-fertilisation." Moreover, the private law of the countries of the EU
is not all that different.
There is much more to say about this invigorating debate, though this paper
can only scratch the surface." But the very fact that such a debate is underway
is testimony to the subversive influence of the EC in the field of private law.
My particular concern in this paper is to explore the extent to which one may
expect a common interpretation of the key provisions of the Directive. Is
"Europeanisation" likely to occur more profoundly than merely on paper, in
the shape of the text of an adopted Directive?
VI. COMMON INTERPRETATION OF DIRECTIVE

93/13

What really will happen? It was explained above that in principle the
source of the national implementing rules in the EC Directive should not be
neglected.97 Terms should be applied and interpreted with an eye to the
background context of European harmonisation and it should not be simply
assumed that orthodox national approaches suffice. This means that in
principle a well-recognised word or phrase found in a national legal act may

8 Eu1. REv. OF PRIVATE L. 321 (2000); see also Resolution, 2000 O.J. (C 377/323) (referring
to "essential" need for greater harmonisation in this field); cf.Resolution on the Harmonisation
of Certain Sectors of the Private Law of the Member States, 1994 O.J. (C 205) 21 (suggesting
a uniform, systematic method of monitoring and implementing commission policies and
attempting to bring all sections of private law into accord).
" See Michael Dougan, Minimum Harmonization and the Internal Market, 37 COMMON

MKT. L. REv. 853 (2000) (consisting of a particular reference to harmonisation); see also Jo
Hunt & Jo Shaw, EuropeanLegal Studies: Then andNow, in LAw's FuTURE(s) (David Hayton
ed., 2000), BEN ROSAMUND, THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (McMillan, 2000); cf
Stephen Weatherill, Flexibility or Fragmentation: Trends in European Integration, in THE
STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (John Usher ed., 2000).
9s Cf Vincenzo Zeno-Zencovich, The 'European Civil Code,' EuropeanLegal Traditions
andNeo-Positivism, 6 EUR. REv. OF PRIVATE L. 349 (1998).
" See Alan Watson, TheEvolution ofWestern PrivateLaw (Johns Hopkins University Press,
2001) (for the broader historical context).
" See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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not mean the same thing in a regime falling within the scope of an EC
Directive as it means, and quite possibly has meant for a century or more, in
a purely domestic context. It is the European Court in Luxembourg that is
responsible for the delivery of authoritative interpretation on the meaning and
effect of EC law, and it is to it that national courts should look, in order to
secure a common approach to the harmonised legal rules that underpin the
process of market integration in Europe. In appropriate cases, national courts
should refer to the European Court questions of interpretation under the Article
234 preliminary reference procedure, thereby better to lay the foundations of
common interpretative approaches. Thus legal concepts such as "unfairness"
and "good faith" are in principle capable of being imbued with a (common)
European shade of meaning that need not coincide with (diverse) orthodox
national approaches. To which one may retort-Nonsense! Or, slightly more
politely-Wishful thinking!
There are several different elements to this scepticism about the reality of
a common European private law. One may doubt that any such thing as a
"common" approach is culturally feasible (let alone desirable) in these fields.
One may doubt that the European Court will have the expertise (let alone the
audacity) to assert a truly European context within which to interpret such
phrases, and one may suspect that in practice it will content itself with very
broad observations and an expectation that national practice will remain
divergent. One may even doubt that national courts will be able (let alone
willing) to refer questions to the European Court under EC Treaty Article 234
in order to provoke such European-level interpretation, given that it now takes
two years on average for the Court to answer questions put to it by national
courts under the preliminary reference procedure-far too long in the context
of a typical consumer dispute.
And yet there are indications that Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in
consumer contracts is beginning to exert an influence on European private law
that is of more practical impact than such sceptical prognosis would suggest.
Both vertically-in the relationship between the European Court and the
national courts-and horizontally-in the relationship between courts sited in
different legal jurisdictions-there are hints of a network of common legal
interpretation.
It was not until the summer of 2000 that the European Court enjoyed its
first opportunity to interpret provisions of Directive 93/13. It pounced.
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Oceano GrupoEditorialSA v. Rocio Murciano Quintero98 is, in its own small
way, a rather remarkable decision.
The proceedings, which had their source before Spanish courts, concerned
the payment of sums due under contracts concluded for the sale on deferred
payment terms of encyclopedias. The contracts contained a term conferring
jurisdiction on the courts in Barcelona. None of the consumers who were party
to the proceedings lived in Barcelona. The company involved in the
proceedings had its principal place of business in Barcelona. The company
sued the consumers in Barcelona when they defaulted on payment. The
consumers were not at this stage represented. The presiding judge referred the
following question of interpretation to the European Court under the
preliminary reference procedure established by Article 234 EC:
Is the scope of the consumer protection provided by Council
Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer
contracts such that the national court may determine of its own
motion whether a term of a contract is unfair when making its
preliminary assessment as to whether a claim should be allowed
to proceed before the ordinary courts?"
The European Court pointed out that the impugned term, by obliging the
consumer to submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of a court which may be a
long way from his or her place of residence, tended to limit effective access to
justice. It caused a substantial imbalance between the rights and obligations
of the contracting parties and it was unfair within the meaning ofthe Directive.
But this did not answer the point of procedural law raised by the referring
Spanish court. Was it for a national court itself to raise the point of
compatibility of a term with (national rules implementing) the Directive, or did
this rest with the consumer litigant? How bold would the Court be in
answering this question, which refers to a matter that is unarguably left
untouched by the explicit text of the Directive? The rules of civil procedure
vary profoundly between the Member States of the EU. One might have
suspected the Court would adopt a "hands off" approach to interpretation
because of this vast diversity, contenting itself with the view that the matter

" 2000 E.C.R. 1-4963 (The judgment of 27 June 2000 represents combined cases C-240/98
and C-244/98).
" Id. at 4972.
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fell for resolution in accordance with the dictates of national procedural law.
The Court did not take this cautious approach.
The Court relied heavily on its reading of the purpose of the Directive. It
decided the point of interpretation in the following manner:
As to the question of whether a court seised of a dispute
concerning a contract between a seller or supplier and a
consumer may determine of its own motion whether a term of the
contract is unfair, it should be noted that the system of protection
introduced by the Directive is based on the idea that the
consumer is in a weak position vis-af-vis the seller or supplier, as
regards both his bargaining power and his level of knowledge.
This leads to the consumer agreeing to terms drawn up in
advance by the seller or supplier without being able to influence
the content of the terms. The aim of Article 6 of the Directive,
which requires Member States to lay down that unfair terms are
not binding on the consumer, would not be achieved if the
consumer were himself obliged to raise the unfair nature of such
terms. In disputes where the amounts involved are often limited,
the lawyers' fees may be higher than the amount at stake, which
may deter the consumer from contesting the application of an
unfair term. While it is the case that, in a number of Member
States, procedural rules enable individuals to defend themselves
in such proceedings, there is a real risk that the consumer,
particularly because of ignorance of the law, will not challenge
the term pleaded against him on the grounds that it is unfair. It
follows that effective protection of the consumer may be attained
only if the national court acknowledges that it has power to
evaluate terms of this kind of its own motion."
And so is national autonomy in the matter of civil procedure sliced open by the
European Court's interpretation of a Directive dealing with the unfairness of
terms in consumer contracts. Anationaljudge is competent to determine of his
or her own motion whether a term of a contract is unfair when making a
preliminary assessment as to whether a claim should be allowed to proceed
before the national courts. What is more, it is strongly arguable that although
the judgrnent is phrased to empower national judges to raise the point of his or
100 Id.
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her own motion it should in fact be concluded that, in order fully to reflect the
pursuit of a common standard of effective consumer protection in the courts
charged with the task of applying (rules based on) the Directive, a judge is
requiredofhisor her own motion to investigate the existence of contaminating
unfairness."°
Oceano Grupo is a ruling that itself requires digestion by national legal
orders and it will, as is typical of preliminary rulings, have heavier impacts in
some than in others.0 2 How it is handled in London will be different from how
it is handled in Paris: but how it is handled in London will also be different
from how it is handled in Oxford. But Oceano Grupo is a ruling which offers
a powerful demonstration of the point that the location of a legal concept in a
piece of European legislation opens up the possibility of a distinctive European
approach to its interpretation, which may require adjustment in some, perhaps
even all, national legal orders, thereby bringing about a process of
harmonisation which is triggered by and founded on the Directive as a text but
which evolves in the hands of the jurists charged with the task of interpreting
and applying that measure within national and transnational legal orders. 3
And this is truly a matter for all jurists, and not simply a matter for the
judges of the European Court. Academic writers are intrigued by the
possibilities and contribute to the dynamic process of investigation and
discovery. One embarks on research into comparative law with an additional
practical spring in one's stride when one is able to survey the possible
reconciliation of legal diversity in the particular context of EC initiatives to
harmonise laws. So, for example, it may emerge that Directive 93/13 on unfair
terms in consumer contracts treats relationships as "contractual" in

'0'See Simon Whittaker, JudicialInterventionism and Consumer Contracts, 117 LAW

Q.

REV. 215 (2001). For a more restricted reading of the judgment see Jules Stuyck, Annotation,
38 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 719 (2001).
2 2000 E.C.R. 1-4963.
"

At the time of writing there has been only one other decision of the European Court

interpreting provisions of Directive 93/13. This is the admittedly less intriguing Cases C-541/99
and C-542/99 (Cape SnC v. Idealservice Srl, 2001 E.C.R. 1-9049, judgment of 22 November

2001), dealing with the meaning of "consumer" under the Directive. But other EC Directives
that harmonise contract law are generating a growing body of interpretative decisions that
similarly elucidate the potential for autonomous European interpretation of legal terms that will
in turn influence national law. See, e.g., Case C-208/98, Berliner Kindl Brauereiv. Siepert,
2000 E.C.R. 1-1741 (concerning Directive 87/102, supra note 51); Case C-45/96 Bayerische
Hypotheken-und Wechselbank v. EdgarDietzinger,1998 E.C.R. 1-1199 (concerning Directive
85/577, supranote 48); Case C- 168/00, Simone Leitner v. TUIDeutschlandGmbH Opinion of
AG Tizzano (2001), not yet decided by the Court (concerning Directive 90/314, supranote 47).
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circumstances in which (some) national legal orders would not recognise the
ascription of contractual responsibility. 04 This would tend to provoke legal
change at national level in the area subject to the EC-derived regime, and, by
subsequent argument by analogy before courts and/or legislators, quite
probably in other areas too that are close to, though formally beyond the reach
of, the "Europeanised" pool of national law. Harmonisation may mean less
than it first appears to mean, in the sense that it cannot mean precise
uniformity, but it may simultaneously mean more than it seems to mean,
insofar as its impact may spill over, beyond the formal reach of the harmonised
regime. And so are legal systems in Europe drawn closer together. Moreover,
legal cross-fertilisation may develop more indirectly than through preliminary
rulings, through "horizontal" cross-referencing between national courts. The
Commission has invested resources in the development of a "European
Database on Case Law about Unfair Contractual Terms" available for a trial
period at the Commission's website.IS The purpose of this resource is to

improve transparency in the application of the rules drawn from the Directive
within the Member States. Judicial decisions from Cork to Corinth, Rovaniemi
to Rimini will be open to electronic inspection. True, such a database is only
as good as the data fed into it. A simple citation of a "foreign" decision
originating in a geographically remote court may also fail to impress a
curmudgeonly local judge in, say, rural Northern England, even if-especially
if-it is dressed up with the stirring exhortation to make real the common
European flavour of the regime directed at the suppression of unfair terms in
consumer contracts. But advocates will be able to replenish their arguments
with an awareness of-if not an explicit reference to-what has happened to
the Directive once digested by a neighboring European legal jurisdiction. And
some judges doubtless will take seriously the possibility of indirect horizontal
dialogue with counterparts in other Member States who have been faced with

the same task of applying EC-derived rules, even if they do not regard the issue

'" See, e.g., Simon Whittaker, Judicial Review in Public Law and in Contract Law: the
example of Student Rules, 21 OXFORD J.L. STUD. 193 (2001) (with reference to English and
French law in particular); Walter Van Gerven, Bridging the Unbridgeable:Community and
National Tort Laws after Francovichand Brasserie in PUBUC INTEREST LITIGATION BEFORE
EUROPEAN COURTS (Hans W. Micklitz & Norbert Reich, eds., 1996) (providing example of
comparative law methodology applied to the development of EC law).
'1 The website can be accessed at http://europa.eu.int/clab/index.htm For a relatively brief
survey of case law, see also Report from the Commission on the Implementation of Council
Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993, supranote 92 (the Commission's first report).
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in the particular case as apt to generate a (vertical) preliminary reference on a
point of interpretation to the European Court in Luxembourg."0 '
VII. CONCLUSION

Where next? The European Commission's Communication on European
Contract Law, issued in the summer of 2001,07 is noticeable for its caution.
The general theme presented by the Commission questions whether the caseby-case approach thus far taken to harmonisation of contract law by the
Community legislature is adequate or whether a more far-reaching agenda
should be drawn up. The Communication sketches four available options
should the existing case-by-case approach to legislative harmonisation be
shown to be inadequate to meet the problems in the contract law field which
the Commission suspects hinder the building of an internal market. These are:
first, no EC action (and self-correction in the market); second, the promotion
of the development of common contract law principles leading to greater
convergence of national laws (to be pursued through Commission support for
deeper research into comparative law); third, improving the quality of
legislation already in place; and fourth, at the most ambitious end of the
spectrum, the adoption of new comprehensive legislation at EC level.
The constitutional basis for such action is, at least in connection with the
more ambitious thinking, a touch shaky in the wake of the European Court's
decision in the "Tobacco Advertising" case.'" ' And it may prove that the next
round of Treaty revision in the European Union will involve closer attention
to defining more precisely what shall be the scope of EC competence in the
field of private law. '9 So the cautious tone adopted by the Commission in its
Communication is understandable. But, perfectly interesting and important
though the grand constitutional dimension is, a great deal of legal
"Europeanisation" is already occurring in the everyday practice of.

'0*

For a good example, albeit drawn from EC intervention into national law of tort/delict

rather than contract, see Nat 7 Blood Author., 3 All E.R. 289 (High Court, 2001) (for the
treatment of EC Directive 85/374).
0 Conmmunication on European Contract Law, supra note 88.
'"Case C-376/98, 2000 E.C.R. 1-08419; see Part III supra.

'0' A Declaration appended to the Nice Treaty sets 2004 as the date for opening the next
intergovernmental conference designed to prepare the groundwork for further revision of the

Treaty. Among issues to be addressed is "[h]ow to establish and monitor a more precise
delimitation of powers between the European Union and the Member States." 2001 OJ. (C So)

85.
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interpretation and application of the existing batch of EC Directives dealing
with contract law. Harmonisation does not simply operate as a one-shot
legislative act but rather as a process which tends to bring together national
legal orders over time. The pathways to common interpretation are
increasingly regularly traversed.

